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Table of Contents

                                                                                             
Editorial Introduction 
I   Reading List — Introductory remarks. 
II   Alexander's method — Categories as ‘conditions of existence’ — Theory of predication. 
III   Alexander on Space as togetherness and Time as distinction. 
IV   Erroneous treatments of relations — the example of causality. 
V   Topics for final paper — The notion of rational science — The demand for clarity — The ‘question of words’. 
VI   Question of quality — criticism of Alexander's materialism — his treatment of mind as consciousness.  
VII   How the propositional theory handles these problems without introducing concepts of levels and of stuff
VIII   Further criticism of “The Clue to Quality” — Alexander's general theory of Space-Time — The paradox of Space-Time as a universal medium. 
IX   Solution of the paradox — Contrast between Alexander's concrete conception of Space-Time and the Idealist view — Alexander's three arguments that space and time logically require each other. 
X   Examination of Alexander's arguments for Space-Time interrelatedness — general criticisms. 
XI   Alexander claims correlations between three characters of Time and three dimensions of Space — the claims discussed, using the example of pendular motion. 
XII   Discussion continued — Spatial irreversibility (enantiomorphism) correlated with temporal asymmetry. 
XIII   Previous discussion continued — The intractability of qualities — connection with spatial and temporal irreversibility. 
XIV   Bradley on qualities and relations — on Space and Time — the ways out of Bradley's antinomies. 
XV   Externality contrasted with internality in, eg., Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant. 
XVI   Alexander on the nature of the categories — Difficulties arising out of not taking a propositional view. 
XVII   What is ‘the historical’? — Alexander's treatment of the categories as predicates discussed and criticised. 
XVIII   Identity, diversity, and existence — relation between identity and co-extensiveness. 
XIX   Identity in the narrow sense — sources of Alexander's exposition of the categories. 
XX   Generic identity as universality — relation of this to being a subject of a proposition — the copula and existence. 
XXI   The five categories arising out of the proposition — distinction between predication and other relations — what is required for recognising containment and juxtaposition
XXII   Relations — the reducibility of relational arguments to syllogistic ones. 
XXIII   Quantification of the predicate — what form contradiction takes in relational propositions, in unanalysed propositions, and in relational propositions — ‘All As are all Bs’ is equivalent to two propositions.. 
XXIV   Relational arguments (continued) — How arguments that depend on transitive relations are translatable into syllogisms, for both symmetrical and asymmetrical relations. 
XXV   General considerations in favour of predicative, and against relational, analysis of arguments. 
XXVI   Universals — why there are no universals (or particulars) — the Idealist concept of a totality (system). 
XXVII   The concept of the term — the Moore-Russell view of abstract universals — connected with the notion of governing principles — the social content of the latter. 
XXVIII   Alexander on universals as ‘plans’ — criticism of this. 
XXIX   Alexander on universals (continued) — how can Alexander distinguish universals from particulars? 
XXX   The Concrete Universal of Idealist theory — the universal as not just instantiated by particulars but as collecting them into a unity — Alexander comes close to this view, although he officially rejects the Concrete Universal. 
XXXI   Reading list on universals — Stout's theory of universals criticised. 
XXXII   Order of the categories — categories of quality — categories of quantity — early view of Russell on primacy of integers in mathematics defended. 
XXXIII   Categories of quantity (continued) — why we should not recognise category of whole and part — interrelations of parts different from a ‘sum’ — what we mean by the latter — Alexander's account of individuation without sortals. 
XXXIV   General remarks about categories — the relation of different categories to different logical procedures. 
XXXV   Alexander's theory of number (unit of enumeration) — the need for reference to sortal concepts in determining a unit — Alexander on the Russell-Frege theory of cardinal number as class of classes similar to a given class.  
XXXVI   Development of other types of numbers from the positive integers — Alexander's treatment of order — ordering relations are asymmetrical. 
XXXVII   Discussion of number and order summarised — Quantity — Intensity. 
XXXVIII   The case of measurement of sensations (Weber's Law). 
XXXIX   Substance — Intensity (continued). 
XL   Distinction between quality and substance — the distinction not observed by Idealism — Alexander on substance — his treatment criticised. 
XLI   Same subject continued — the three types of categories distinguished — more on substance: it should be thought of in terms of composition (constitution). 
XLII   Relation between substance as composition, and causality — analogy with the doctrine of Heraclitus — Causality — Kant's view leaves out concomitance and replacement
XLIII   More on the order and grouping of categories — Causality (continued) — Alexander gives a counterfactual analysis that is too weak: it leaves out universality — is causality immanent or transeunt? 
XLIV   Another grouping of categories — Causality (continued) — identity and difference in change — reciprocity of causation — Alexander's neglect of universality. 
XLV   There is a sense in which ‘force’ is to be rejected, and a sense in which it is not — Alexander's immanentism — Reciprocity. 
XLVI   The One and the Many — Space-Time as the source of the categories — Individuality.  

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