§ 68. “Chosen by the People of the State.”
The senators for a State are to be chosen by those of “The People of the State” possessed of the qualifications prescribed by section 8. This provision marks a great advance in a democratic direction. The Commonwealth Bill of 1891, following the precedent of the Constitution of the United States, provided that the Senators for each State should be directly chosen by the Houses of the Parliament of the State. In the Canadian Constitution the Senators are appointed by the Governor-General for life. The principle of popular election, on which the Senate of the Commonwealth is founded, is more in harmony with the progressive instincts and tendencies of the times than those according to which the Senate of the United States and the Senate of Canada are called into existence. In the Convention which drafted the Constitution of the Commonwealth not a single member was found in favour of a nominated Senate. It was generally conceded, not only that a chamber so constituted would be of an obsolete type and repugnant to the drift of modern political thought, but that, as a Council of States, it would be an infirm and comparatively ineffective legislative body. A few members were, indeed, for a time in favour of a Senate elected by the State legislatures; but they eventually abandoned that view as the debate progressed, and as the strong volume of authoritative opinion, and the overwhelming mass of evidence opposed to the manner in which the Senate of United States is chosen, was presented and developed.
The mode of choosing Senators embodied in the American Constitution was adopted in times and under circumstances quite different from those of the present; but even in the Philadelphia Convention which drafted that Constitution there were wise and far-seeing men who advocated the election of Senators directly by the people. “The States,” contended James Wilson, one of the Representatives of Pennsylvania, “are in no danger of being devoured by the national government; I wish to keep them from devouring the national government. Their existence is made essential by the great extent of our country. I am for an election of the second branch by the people in large districts, subdividing the districts only for the accommodation of voters.” (Bancroft's History of the Constitution of the U.S. 2nd vol. p. 30.)
As we have already seen, the functions of the Senate are of a double kind: first as a chamber of revision and review in matters of general legislation; and, secondly, as a chamber to represent the particular views, opinions, and interests of the States, in matters admittedly within the sphere of the federal authority but respecting which differences might arise, as well as for the purpose of resisting proposals not within the sphere of the federal authority. For the purpose of exercising powers such as these it was contended, with unanswerable force, that the Senate of the Commonwealth could and should be chosen by the process of popular election, and that there was no occasion to vest the choice in the State legislatures. In Australia there was a particular reason, in addition to the democratic one, why the American precedent should not be followed. In
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two of the six Australian colonies, namely, Queensland and New South Wales, the Upper Houses were nominated by the Crown, and not elected by the people; and the same was the case in New Zealand. It would be highly undesirable for Federal Senators to be elected by any Legislature, one branch of which would not be elected by the people, and, therefore, would not be responsible to the people. It would also be highly desirable that the senators representing the various States should be elected on a uniform basis, but there would be no such uniformity if some senators were elected by nominated Chambers and others by Chambers deriving their existence directly from the people. The struggle in Queensland over the Federal Enabling Bill was an object lesson of the difficulties to be encountered where there were two Chambers of a different basic Constitution. In Queensland the Legislative Assembly distinctly denied the right of the nominated Upper House to take part in the election of members to be sent to the Federal Convention. That was the whole contest. In the same way we might expect even more formidable objections to be taken to the Constitution of a Federal Senate partly elected by nominee Chambers. In addition to these considerations there was a gathering mass of testimony before the Convention as to the unsatisfactory manner in which the American system of senatorial elections was conducted.
“In one respect alone is there any sign of a popular demand for a change in either the functions or the construction of the Senate. A movement is now on foot to secure a constitutional amendment transferring the election of senators from the State legislatures to the people; and on account of the facilities for intrigue and bribery which are afforded by the present method, it is not unlikely that such a change would be beneficial. But the Senate of the United States will probably endure as long as any second legislative chamber upon the earth” (Foster, Comm. I. p. 498.)
“A proposal recently made to amend the Federal Constitution by taking the election of senators from the legislatures in order to vest it in the people of each State, is approved by some judicious publicists, who think that bad candidates will have less chance with the party at large and the people than they now have in bodies apt to be controlled by a knot of party managers. A nomination made for a popular election will at least be made publicly, whereas now a nomination for an election by a legislature may be made secretly.” (Bryce, The American Commonwealth, I. pp. 96 and 97; Senator Mitchell's article in the Forum, June 6, 1896.)
“The method of election to the Senate or second Chamber is a matter that will be thrashed out in the Committee and upon the discussion of the Bill. There are some who think the only way to preserve definite responsibility is to have the election by the people of the quota of each State to the Senate. There are others who think that could be well and best done by the election of the quota of each State by its legislature; there are others, too, who think that there should be a difference in suffrage between the electorate which chooses the States Council and the National Assembly. It should not be our purpose now to lay down definite lines upon any one of those subjects, because they are really questions which should be decided only after we become acquainted with each others' views in this debate and upon the discussion in Committee, and when the Bill is being discussed. It is then, and then only, that we shall be fully in possession of the reasons which underlie each others' views, and be able to say how far we can demand concessions in return.” (Mr. Edmund Barton, Conv. Deb., Adel., p. 22.)