§ 118. “Sooner Dissolved.”
The House of Representatives may continue in existence for three years from the day of its first meeting, but it may be “sooner dissolved” by the Governor-General. Its normal term is therefore a triennial one, and is the same as that of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, the Legislative Assembly of Victoria, the Legislative Assembly of Queensland, the House of Assembly of South Australia, the House of Assembly of Tasmania, and the House of Representatives of New Zealand, which are elected for three years, but are liable to be sooner dissolved by the Crown. The Legislative Assembly of Western Australia is elected for four years, and the House of Commons of Canada for five years; both, however, being liable to be sooner dissolved by the Crown. The American House of Representatives is elected for two years, but is not liable to dissolution before the expiration of its term.
The right to dissolve the House of Representatives is reserved to the Crown. This is one of the few prerogatives which may be exercised by the Queen's Representative, according to his discretion as a constitutional ruler, and if necessary, a dissolution may be refused to responsible ministers for the time being. A refusal to grant a dissolution would no doubt be a ground for the resignation of the Ministry whose advice was disregarded. Nevertheless, such refusal could not be challenged as unconstitutional. During the year 1899, three precedents occurred in Australia, which show that in the exercise of this power of dissolution the Representative of the Crown is not a mere passive instrument in the hands of his Ministers. It is well known that when an adverse vote was, on 7th September, 1899, carried against Mr. G. H. Reid in the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, he advised Lord Beauchamp to dissolve the House. That advice the Governor did not feel justified in accepting, and accordingly Mr. Reid resigned, and Mr. (now Sir William) Lyne formed a new administration. On 28th November following, the Kingston Ministry suffered a defeat in the House of Assembly of South Australia. Mr. Kingston applied to Lord Tennyson for a dissolution, which being refused, he resigned, and a new Ministry was formed by Mr. Solomon. And on 1st December of the same year, when a vote of want of confidence was carried against Sir George Turner in the Victorian Assembly, he applied to Lord Brassey for a dissolution, which was refused; and he then resigned, Mr. Allan McLean being sent for. These recent precedents show that the Representative of the Crown, in the exercise of its undoubted prerogative to grant or refuse a dissolution, can wield an important influence in the life of a Ministry, and in the duration and possible action of a Parliament.
The difference between a grant and a refusal of a dissolution is: (1) A grant of a dissolution is an Executive act, to which the Crown assents, and for which the Ministry tendering the advice and doing the act are responsible to Parliament and the country; (2) a refusal to grant a dissolution is not an Executive act; it is a negation of one, for which the Representative of the Crown is alone responsible, although it is sometimes stated that the incoming Ministry assumes the responsibility of the refusal by undertaking to carry on the Queen's Government for the time being.
The leading characteristics of this prerogative, and the general principles according to which the discretionary power of the Crown to dissolve or to decline to dissolve is exercised, may be gathered from the authorities. (See Note, “Dissolve,” § 63, supra.)
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29. Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, the Parliament of any State may make laws for determining the divisions in each State119 for which members of the House of Representatives may be chosen, and the number of members to be chosen for each division120. A division shall not be formed out of parts of different States121.
In the absence of other provision, each State shall be one electorate.
UNITED STATES.—The times, places, and manner of holding elections for … representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators.—Const., Art. I., sec. 4, sub-sec. 1. SWITZERLAND.—The elections for the National Council … are held in federal electoral districts, which in no case shall be formed out of parts of different Cantons.—Const., Art. 73. CANADA.—Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides, Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick shall, for the purposes of the election of members to serve in the House of Commons, be divided into electoral districts as follows.—B.N.A. Act, 1867, sec. 40.HISTORICAL NOTE.—Clause 31, Chap. I. of the Commonwealth Bill of 1891 was as follows:—
“The electoral divisions of the several States for the purpose of returning members of the House of Representatives shall be determined from time to time by the Parliaments of the several States.”
At the Adelaide session, 1897, the clause was introduced and passed as follows:—
“Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the electoral divisions of the several States for the purpose of returning members of the House of Representatives, and the number of members to be chosen for each electoral division, shall be determined from time to time by the Parliaments of the several States. Until division each State shall be one electorate.”
At the Sydney session, a suggestion by the House of Assembly of Tasmania, to omit “Until the Parliament otherwise provides,” and a suggestion by both Houses of the Victorian Parliament, to omit “until division each State shall be one electorate,” were negatived. (Conv. Deb., Syd. [1897], pp. 454-5.) At the Melbourne session, after the first report, the clause was verbally amended on Mr. Barton's motion, and the words “No electoral district shall be formed out of parts of different States” were added. These words were taken from the Swiss Constitution (Supra), the necessity for them being due to the amendment already made in sec. 24, that members of the House of Representatives should be chosen not by “the people of the several States,” but by “the people of the Commonwealth.” (Conv. Deb., Melb., p. 1840.) After the fourth report, the clause was verbally altered.